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Abstract—This paper describes the critical (feared) scenar-
ios derivation tool ESA PetriNet (Extraction Scenarios Algo-
rithm from Petri Net) available from : http://www.laas.fr/ESA.
ESA PetriNet allows to derive scenarios leading to critical
(feared) situation in embedded systems. The system model is
given by a Petri net. To derive critical scenarios and to avoid
the state space explosion, the solution is to use directly the Petri
net model. Linear logic (which does not appears in this paper)
offers a theoretical framework to interpret the Petri net model
and to extract the scenarios. ESA PetriNet provides all minimal
scenarios which contain strictly necessary and sufficient events to
reach a specified state. ESA PetriNet can be used with classical
Petri net modelling or in its objects oriented version.
Index Terms—Embedded systems, Feared scenarios extraction,
Petri nets, reliability, Dynamic systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
The growing complexity of embedded systems [1], includ-
ing more and more ECU (Electronic Control Units), makes it
difficult to perform the dependability analysis of such systems.
Considering mechatronic systems in the automotive domain
and focusing on dependability analysis, one way to help
designers is to identify critical scenarios and define corrective
actions to avoid them as early as possible in the design stage.
This means that when some event affecting the safety of the
system occurs, a reconfiguration action is executed in order to
maintain the vehicle in a safe degraded state. If the reconfig-
uration fails then the system will reach a critical (dangerous)
state with dramatic consequences for the passengers. So it is
important to understand how the system reaches such critical
states at the early design stage of the system in order to set
up the reconfiguration actions.
The safety analysis [2] of dynamic embedded systems
starts with a qualitative analysis, the objective of which is
to determine the catastrophic or unacceptable behavior of the
system.
For static systems the most popular approach for reliability
analysis is based on fault trees with its associated tool [3].
Static fault trees use traditional Boolean Logic functions to
represent the combination of component failures (events) that
cause system failure. One interesting aspect of fault trees is
that a set of minimal cutsets [4] can be derived. However, to
deal with the complexity of dynamic systems, fault trees are
not sufficient: safety analysis of such systems must include
timing considerations and the order of events [5].
To overcome these limitations, Dugan [6] introduces a new
type of gate in order to differentiate the static aspects from
the dynamic ones. The dynamic gates allow Markov analysis.
One drawback is that it is not possible to derive a qualitative
analysis, and moreover some produced feared scenarios can
lead to non-permanent feared states.
Simulation is another popular method, in particular the
Monte-Carlo simulation [7]. Good results can be obtained
when simulation is applied. Nevertheless, when used for de-
pendability analysis simulation methods have to deal with the
so-called ”rare events problem”.
Other methods based on the exploration of the state graph,
like the Markov graph or the Petri net accessibility graph[8],
are limited by the problem of state space explosion.
So, to achieve the qualitative analysis we propose an
approach focused on the search for critical scenarios in order
to propose a way to avoid the problem of state space explosion.
The basic idea is to use a Petri net model and directly extract
the critical scenarios without building the accessibility graph.
Linear logic [9], [10] offers a formal framework to interpret
the Petri net model and to extract the scenarios. The key point
of this approach is equivalence between reachability in the
Petri net and linear logic sequent provability [11]. Linear logic
thus makes it possible to analyze these cause-effect relations.
To model Embedded systems, temporal Petri nets are used.
They allow to model some continuous aspects of these sys-
tems. This modelling approach has the advantage of clearly
separating the continuous aspects (time modelling) from the
discrete ones. It allows a logical analysis using linear logic
based on the causality of events leading to a critical state.
Starting from a critical state, it is possible to go back
through the chain of causalities and to point out only those
scenarios leading to a critical situation. Each scenario is a
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representation of the partial order of events necessary for
the occurrence of the critical outcome. The final objective
is to determine minimal scenarios. Indeed, a critical scenario
can contain events (the consequence of other events of the
scenario) which are not strictly necessary to reach the final
critical state. Such a scenario is not minimal. To deal with
the concept of minimality of a scenario we introduce a formal
definition of a minimal scenario. This definition has been used
in our algorithm to derive automatically critical scenarios, but
only the minimal ones. Another application of the proposed
approach is the verification of behavioral properties like safety.
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents briefly
the deriving scenarios extraction approach. Section 3 describes
ESA PetriNet tool. In section 4 an example illustrates the
capabilities of the tool. Finally, section 5 draws a number of
conclusions and future work.
II. SCENARIO EXTRACTION APPROACH
A. Critical scenario
Critical scenario is a set of events (transition firings for a
Petri net model) verifying a partial order and leading from
one partial state corresponding to normal behavior (partial
marking) to another one that represents a dangerous situation
of the system.
In this part we present briefly the approach for deriving
critical scenarios for dynamic reliability analysis.
B. System modelling
The system modelling is based on Petri net [12] using or
not the object-oriented concepts [13], [14]. Object oriented
approach can be used to facilitate the modelling and analysis
of complex systems.
There are several proposals incorporating the notion of time
into different components of the Petri net framework, namely
tokens, transitions, places, and arcs [15]. In this work we
use a temporal Petri net where the durations are associated
with transitions . Let us now give the formal definition of the
temporal Petri nets.
Definition [temporal Petri net]: A Temporal Petri net
is a pair Ntl =< N, D > where N is a Petri net
< P, T, Pre, Post > and D is a function that associates
to each transition ti a static temporal interval d(ti) =
[dimin(ti), dimax(ti)] that describes the enabling duration.
C. Principles of the approach
The method is based on a qualitative analysis stemming
from the Petri net model. The objective is to extract and
clearly identify the critical scenarios (leading from one partial
state corresponding to normal behavior to another one that
represents a dangerous situation of the system) starting from
a model that contains the necessary knowledge to make the
analysis. The initial partial knowledge of the critical state is
progressively enriched while analyzing the components neces-
sary to its occurrence. This method is made up of two steps:
a backward and a forward reasoning process. The backward
reasoning starts from the partial critical state in order to derive
the events that are necessary to reach it, and gives the last
nominal states preceding the critical behavior. The forward
reasoning starts from these nominal states, and determines the
components at the source of the critical scenario. To determine
the complete context in which the critical scenario occurs,
the concept of context enrichment is introduced. The context
enrichment is carried out by adding tokens to some places
(empty input places of potentially enabled transitions) that can
have an impact on the critical scenario that is being explored
(adding one token in the place p0 to make the transition t0,
initially potentially enabled, enabled in the example of the
Figure 1)).

Fig. 1. Marking enrichment
D. Principles of scenario extraction algorithm
The deriving scenarios algorithm (both backward and for-
ward reasoning) [13] can be considered as a Petri net player,
but not classical Petri net player (occurrence graph). It is a
player based on linear logic that guides the construction of the
partial orders between events [9].
E. Steps of the method
1) Determining the nominal states
2) Determining the target states (partial critical states or
states to be analyzed).
3) Backward reasoning starting from the partial critical
state.
4) Forward reasoning starting from the objects that contain
the conditioning state.
1) The first step is to determine the places that, when
marked, represent a normal operation state. These ’nominal’
places will be used as ”stop criteria” for backward reasoning.
This step can be achieved in two ways: by using a priori
knowledge of the normal operation states of the system, or by
a Monte Carlo simulation of the model (in a short temporal
window) in order to determine the marking probabilities of the
places of the Petri net. The places that will have a significant
marking probability will be considered as nominal places.
2) The second step determines the target states to be ana-
lyzed. This target states can be either a partial critical state or
another partial state with a direct or indirect link to the critical
state (for example a place that represents the availability of a
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resource that allows operating even with presence of a fault,
and avoids the occurrence of the critical event).
3) Backward reasoning: The aim of this step is to determine
the ”conditioning states” that correspond to the last normal
operation state of the system. It generates the sets of paths
that lead to the partial critical state. Backward reasoning is
carried out on the reversed Petri net model. In this reversed
Petri net, the initial marking corresponds to each minimal
Cutset of the Boolean function that represents a critical state.
We search for all the minimal scenarios (only the necessary
transitions are fired) that lead from the initial marking to a
final marking, containing only places that are associated with
normal operation. During this step, starting from the initial
context that concerns one or more objects, in most cases we
have to enrich the initial context.
4) Forward reasoning: This step is carried out on the initial
Petri net with the ’conditioning states’ as initial marking. The
goal is to determine the reachability of the critical state and
to identify the scenarios that lead to it, or to prove that the
critical state will never be reached. It aims also to identify
the bifurcations between the normal behavior and the critical
one and also to set the conditions (marking of some places
and introduced objects) associated to these bifurcations. The
analysis of these bifurcations (that correspond to transitions)
gives information about the occurrence of events which are the
causes of the critical state.
III. TOOL PRESENTATION
A. Objectives of ESA PetriNet tool
ESA PetriNet (Figure 2) implements the deriving critical
scenarios algorithm. It allows to generate critical scenarios
leading the system from normal working to critical situation.
For designers the interesting scenarios are minimal ones.
Minimal scenario [16] means that it contains only necessary
events to reach one marking from another one. So minimality
analysis [16] is implemented in to ESA PetriNet. It allows to
derive only consistent scenarios.
Another functionality of ESA PetriNet is the verification
of behavior properties. Indeed, it is possible to prove that one
scenario respects some temporal constraints. In this paper the
approach for verification is not presented. The principles of
the approach can be found in [17].
B. Input files
1) Petri net models and structural analysis: The input files
of the tool correspond to a textual description of the temporal
Petri net model of the system. To edit these files, the tool TINA
(TIme Petri Net Analyzer) [18], [19](Figure 3) is used. The
definitions of the nominal states and the target states (referring
to step 1 and 2 of the method) are also done in these files,
through the labels associated to the places of the Petri nets.
The Petri net models can be modified directly from
ESA PetriNet by editing TINA files in their textual or graph-
ical description.
More specifically, the input files corresponding to the textual
description of the Petri nets are the result files of the structural

Fig. 2. ESA PetriNet Screen snapshot
analysis (Figure 5) offered by TINA. These files are used
because they contain both the descriptions of the Petri nets
and the marking invariants necessary for marking enrichments.
Indeed, marking enrichments are carried out during the feared
scenario research algorithm, but they are not always possible.
And to preserve the system consistency, that’s the marking
invariants which determine if the marking enrichments are
possible or not.
2) Communication file: For the object oriented approach,
each object is modelled by one Petri net and the communica-
tion between objects is specified. Figure 4 shows communica-
tions between objects of the case study. It will be commented
later.
C. output files
1) Result File: The single output file provided by an
analysis with ESA PetriNet is the result file. It contains a
textual description of the generated feared scenarios.
But a common way to represent scenarios is in the form
of graphs, because they clearly show the sequence of events,
partial orders and the parallelism between some events. Indeed,
a precedence graph is a directed acyclic graph defined by
a set of events (those of the scenario) and a precedence
relationship that corresponds to the partial order of the scenario
created by the various links between the events. Consequently,
ESA PetriNet offers the possibility to display the scenarios in
the forme of precedence graphs starting from the result file by
clicking on the ”Precedence Graphs” button.
D. User interface
In order to obtain the critical scenarios with ESA PetriNet,
we must indicate some files through the user interface (Fig-
ure 2). Firstly, all the Petri net objects that we need must
be given to the software. Each Petri net that models one
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
Fig. 3. TINA snapshot

Fig. 4. Communication file
object is specified. We have already seen that these files are
created and obtained with another tool: TINA. Next, we must
define a communication file in order to keep the consistency
of the model, eventually by using the editor provided with
ESA PetriNet. The last file that must be defined trough the
interface is the result file.
Once all the needed files have been specified, we run the
extraction of the critical scenarios by clicking on the dedicated
button: ”Generate Scenarios”. Finally, the precedence graphs
are displayed by using the ”Precedence Graphs” button.
E. Installation
ESA PetriNet can be downloaded from www.laas.fr/ESA.
ESA PetriNet is coded in Java language, so a Java virtual
machine is needed. Windows OS version is available. The
Linux version will be developed later.
IV. EXAMPLE AND APPLICATION
The case study (inspired from automotive industy) is based
on a volume regulation system of two tanks (Figure 6). It
consists of a computer, two pumps, three electrovalves, two

Fig. 5. Structural analysis results file
volume sensors, the two regulated tanks (Tank1 and Tank2)
and a third tank for draining. The two regulated tanks are
used on demand of a user. This demand is described by a
function of time. The volume of each tank must be kept inside
a given interval [Vimin, Vimax]. The volume is controlled by
the computer, which decides, according to the values given
by the volume sensors, to fill (or not) the concerned tank by

















Fig. 6. Case study
The control strategy of the computer is such that the
electrovalve is closed whenever the volume of the controlled
tank exceeds the upper limit Vimax (in the conjunction phase).
On the other hand, the computer commands the opening of
the electrovalve each time the value of the volume in the
controlled tank is lower than the limit Vimin (in the disjunction
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phase). We distinguish two normal phases of the system,
corresponding to the state of the electrovalve:
• A conjunction phase when the electrovalve is open. The
volume in the tank is increasing during this phase, no
matter what is the value of the outgoing flow to the user
(the ingoing flow to the electrovalve is much higher than
the outgoing flow).
• A disjunction phase when the electrovalve is closed. The
volume in the tank is decreasing during this phase.
This system must supply the user while avoiding the
overflow of the tanks. A relief electrovalve is added to the
system in order to drain the tanks in case of overflow. This
third electrovalve is viewed as a shared resource between the
two main tanks, and it can be used for only one tank at a
time. When the volume of one tank exceeds the high security
limit (ViL), the computer commands the opening of the relief
electrovalve. As we focus our study on critical scenarios,
and in order to simplify the problem we consider that only
the electrovalves can have failures. A typical failure of the
electrovalves one and two corresponds to a stuck open (or
closed) state in which the electrovalve does not react to a
closure (or opening) command of the computer. These two
electrovalves can be repaired after failure occurrence. When
the electrovalve 3 has a failure it is definitively out of service.
A. Modelling
We propose 3 object classes for the modelling of this
system: one tank class and two electrovalve classes. We define
two objects (tank1 and tank2) instances of tank class, two
objects (EV1 and EV2 electrovalves) instances of the first
electrovalve class and one object (relief electrovalve) instance
of the third class. In order to deal with the continuous aspects
of the system, the volume thresholds (Vimin, Vimax, ViL, Vis)
that correspond to the enabling functions of the Differential
Predicate Transition Petri Nets are replaced by temporal thresh-
olds (Timin, Timax, TiL, Tis). These temporal thresholds are
obtained by temporal abstraction of the continuous dynamic
associated to places Vi cr and Vi dec.
1) Model of the tanks: (Figure 3) shows the model of Tank1
(the model of the tank2 is identical). Place V1 dec represents
the disjunction phase (the volume is decreasing), and the place
V1 cr represents the conjunction phase in which the volume
is increasing. When the volume exceeds V1max (temporal
interval [1,1]) the tank calls a ’close electrovalve 1’ method
(associated with transition T11) provided by the electrovalve
EV1. The method ’Open electrovalve 1’ (associated with tran-
sition T12) is called by the Tank1 when the volume becomes
lower than V1min (interval [1,1]). When the volume in the
Tank1 exceeds the high security limit V1L (interval [2,2]),
the ’open electrovalve 3’ method (transition T14) provided by
the relief electrovalve is called in order to drain Tank1. This
phase lasts the time necessary for the volume to reach the low
threshold V1min. A conjunction phase is started again (place
V1 cr is marked) by firing transition T15.
There is overflow on the Tank1, when the volume in this
tank exceeds V1S (V1S reached in the interval [3,3] is higher
than V1max and V1L). In this case, transition T13 is fired and
place E red1 is marked. The firing of T13 is considered as the
critical event.
2) Model of the electrovalve 1 (EV1): The electrovalve 1
(EV1) when opened supplies the Tank1 in the conjunction
phase (Figure 7).

Fig. 7. Petri net model of the electrovalve 1
The EV1 is closed (firing of transition t11) when the Tank1
calls the ’close electrovalve 1’ method. The transition t12
represents the opening of the electrovalve. The two methods
provided by the EV1 ensure that the volume in the Tank1 is
kept inside a given interval [V1min, V1max].
The failures of the electrovalve are represented by the
transitions Def1 O (stuck open) or Def1 F (stuck closed). The
transitions Rep1 O and Rep1 F represent the repair of the
electrovalve. Duration is associated with the firing of these
transitions.
3) Model of the relief electrovalve 3: The relief elec-
trovalve is shared between the two tanks and its model is
presented in (Figure 8). The place EV3 OK represents the
availability of the valve. The transition t14 (respectively t24)
is the ’open electrovalve 3’ provided method that can be called
by the Tank1 (respectively Tank2) when the volume exceeds
V1L (respectively V2L). The electrovalve 3 can fail (firing of
the transition def3). In this case, place EV3 HS is marked and
the electrovalve is out of order.

Fig. 8. Petri net model of the relief electrovalve.
Remark:
1) We can see in figure 4 (textual file which represents the
communications between objects). For example, the transition
T11 of the tank1 calls the transition t11 of the electrovalve 1.
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2) In figure 5 we can see the results of the structural
analysis. For example, for the object tank1, there is a P-
invariant that corresponds to the places : E red1 V1 cr V1 dec
V1 dec s. So when one of these places is marked, it is not
possible to enrich the other places.
B. Application of the method and results
ESA PetriNet tool derives 2 minimal critical scenarios
(Figure 9) leading to the critical state E red1 (overflow of
the tank1).
The first scenario is composed by the events: failure of
electrovalve 1, failure of the relief electrovalve (EV3), followed
by the overflow of tank1 (figure 9).
The second scenario is composed by the events: failure of
electrovalve 1 and failure of electrovalve 2, the use of the relief
electrovalve (EV3) to drain tank2, followed by the overflow of
tank1.
 
Fig. 9. Generated scenarios
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented ESA PetriNet tool that imple-
ments our algorithm for deriving critical scenario in embedded
systems.
System modelling is based on temporal Petri net. The
objects oriented approach allows to facilitate system modelling
and scenario analysis.
Another important aspect is the minimality of derived
scenarios. The tool allows generating only pertinent scenarios.
It takes into account the notion of minimal scenario [16]
which is the relevant information for designers and facilitates
analysis.
In order to deal with complex dynamic (hybrid systems)
and overcome the limitation of temporal abstraction (used
for continuous dynamic approximation), future works will
introduce the possibility of integrating complex differential
equation (one way is to connect the tool to a dynamic solver).
Another extension we have to work on is the quantitative
analysis. Monte Carlo simulation appears as the technique
that will be used to achieve quantitative analysis and will be
implemented in ESA PetriNet.
Current software development concerns improving the in-
terface tool specially its English version. An English web site
will be dedicated for it.
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